I had the great honour of delivering the 23rd Annual Raymond Williams lecture at the prestigious Wedgwood College in Barlaston. A copy of my speech is available at www.tristramhunt.com/RaymondWilliams.doc or you can read a transcript below.
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‘The Idea of Equality’
23rd Annual Raymond Williams
Wedgwood College, Barlaston, Stoke-on-Trent
Thank you. It is a pleasure to be invited here to give this lecture.
It is also a great honour to be giving a lecture in the name of Raymond Williams, one of the great academic all-rounders of the 20th century and undoubtedly a leviathan of the left’s intellectual history. In Culture and Society, his great work of 1958, he wrote that ‘the only inequality that is evil is inequality that denies the essential equality of being.’
In the course of this lecture, I hope very much, to argue for an understanding of equality of which, Raymond would approve.
In 2009, Professors Richard G Wilkinson and Kate Pickett published The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, contributing a new phrase to the political lexicon in ‘Evidence Based Politics’ and generating a crescendo of acclaim and controversy.
It demonstrated a significant correlation between levels of social inequality and no fewer than 11 major health and social problems: the more unequal the society, the more likely they are to suffer from the corrosive effects of these problems. In short, equal societies are healthier, happier, more resilient, better educated and enjoy greater levels of social cohesion and well-being.
Irrespective of the inherent complexity of moving from striking correlation to definite causation, the breadth and volume of the evidence on show cannot be denied. It is undoubtedly one of the most arresting pieces of political science research of our era and provides a significant shot in arm for those of us committed to creating a fairer, more equal society.
But if recent political history tells us anything it is that redistribution and public investment, in and of itself, will not guarantee a more equal society. To avoid the mistakes of the past, politicians must affirmatively answer one of the most enduring questions in the history of political thought: equality of what? Precisely what is it, that we should be equalising?
This lecture has been billed as ‘The Idea of Equality – from the perspective of a historian and a biographer of Engels.’ However, perhaps a more accurate title would be ‘The Future of Equality’ – from the perspective of a historian and a biographer of Engels.
Because, as a response to the insights of The Spirit Level and an answer the ‘Equality of What’ question, I propose to explore an unlikely alliance between the life and work of Friedrich Engels and the contemporary egalitarian philosophy of the Nobel Prize winning, Indian economist, Amartya Sen.
We begin, appropriately enough, with Engels.
‘If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich’
At the dawn of the new Millennium, the Canadian political philosopher, G.A Cohen published a collection of essays entitled, ‘If You’re an Egalitarian, How come You’re so Rich?’ written, not altogether without irony, from underneath the elegant spires of All Souls College, Oxford.
Cohen’s main argument was that egalitarian principles of justice cannot be divorced from an underlying commitment to an egalitarian ‘ethos’; that it is not enough for egalitarians to simply wait for the creation of maximally just, egalitarian institutions. Rather a true commitment to equality must manifest itself at the level of personal moral choices. Individual behaviour, particularly when it involves satiating the desires of western capitalist excess, should be modified accordingly.
It is telling that the publication of this work effectively marked the end of Cohen’s long standing commitment to Marxism in favour of an idiosyncratic version of ‘luck egalitarian’ analytical philosophy – the belief that inequalities in how well off people are, are only permissible when they are caused by the responsible moral choices people make and not when they are caused by the unchosen, circumstances of luck, such as the conditions we are born into and even the individual talents we possess.
However, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels taught their followers to scorn all forms of moralising socialism. They argued that capitalism was bound to collapse under its own economic contradictions and that the abundance that would reign in the new, post-capitalist era would render questions of distributive justice irrelevant. For Engels, this was a particularly convenient position. He was the first, the greatest, and perhaps the most unapologetic champagne communist.
In 1890, just over 100 years before Cohen would publish his repudiation of such behaviour, Engels celebrated his 70th birthday. He boasted to Laura Lafargue, the daughter of his old friend Marx, that ‘We kept it up till half past three in the morning and drank, besides claret, sixteen bottles of champagne – that morning we had 12 dozen oysters.’
This was not an isolated act of indulgence. During the 1870s his Primrose Hill home had become a popular venue for socialist excess. One of his communist contemporaries, August Babel, recalled that ‘On Sundays, Engels would throw open his house. On those puritanical days when no merry men can bear life in London, Engels’s house was open to all, and no one left before 2 or 3 in the morning.’
Pilsner, claret, and vast bowels of Maitrank – a May wine flavoured with woodruff – were consumed while Engels sang German folk-songs or drunkenly recited The Vicar of Bray.
But Engels’s personal exuberance was not a reflection of a deeply conflicted temperament or a highly developed ability to compartmentalise his different roles. Engels did not lurch between bouts of sustained hedonistic debauchery and intervening periods of reproach or self-flagellation, for betraying his ideals. For Engels, there was no conflict to resolve, no betrayal to reconcile. Rather his exuberance was an expression of his political ideology itself: an almost Rabelaisian belief in the capacity of socialism to fulfil human pleasure. It was an attractive, seductive approach to progressive politics, an approach which has, for the most part, been abandoned.
The Kingdom of Freedom
Perhaps it was a reaction to a relentlessly prim childhood. The son of a reactionary, God-fearing capitalist, Engels was brought up in the Rhineland town of Barmen destined to join the family textile firm. But it was not long before the prospect of Calvinist piety and bourgeois self-reserve quickly lost its appeal. Sent as an apprentice to the more free-wheeling city of Bremen, Engels’s thirst for enjoyment quickly became apparent. ‘We now have a complete stock of beer in the office; under the table, behind the stove, behind the cupboard, everywhere are beer bottles,’ he wrote to his sister Marie before going on to describe his hectic diary of dinner engagements, Beethoven concerts and fencing duels.
In Berlin, where he was sent for military training, the partying continued as Engels fell in with the notorious Doctor’s Club of heavy-drinking, hard-philosophising Young Hegelians. They smashed up beer cellars, poured over pornography and then debated the errors of Hegelian idealism long into the night.
With the wine went the women. Late in life, Engels would pen a celebrated tract – The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State – ridiculing the bourgeois hypocrisy of marriage and urging a more relaxed system of partner swapping and communal child-rearing. He would also condemn prostitution as ‘the most tangible exploitation – one directly attacking the physical body – of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie.’
But he exhibited no such reservations in the mid-1840s as he indulged his passion for Parisian whores. ‘If I had an income of 5000 francs I would do nothing but work and amuse myself with women until I went to pieces,’ he wrote to the more monogamous Marx. ‘If there were no Frenchwomen, life wouldn’t be worth living. But so long as there are grisettes, well and good!’
By this time Marx and Engels had joined intellectual forces and one of their first works, The German Ideology, deftly elucidated communism’s promise of human pleasure. As competition and private property gave way to communism men would regain ‘control of exchange, production and the mode of their mutual relationship.’ ‘The alienation between men and their products’ would dissolve.
In contrast to capitalist society, where the division of labour forced each man into ‘a particular, exclusive sphere of activity,’ communist society would regulate production and thereby ensure that ‘nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes … to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner.’ It was a leap, from the kingdom of necessity, to the kingdom of freedom.
But just as that promise seemed tangible, Engels was hurled back to the rigid necessity of middle-class respectability. After the failure of the1848-9 European revolutions, Marx retreated to the British Museum to write Das Kapital forcing Engels to take up a job at his father’s Manchester mill. For the next twenty years he lived a double-life as cotton lord and revolutionary communist, finding the smug, dissenting prosperity of mid-Victorian Manchester a grinding bore.
First, there was the unavoidable contradiction of his position as a mill-owning Marxist – ‘most beastly of all is the fact of being a bourgeois who actively takes sides against the proletariat.’ Then there was the provincial philistinism of a city wholly given over to cotton and cash. ‘I drink rum and water and spend my time ‘twixt twist and tedium,’ he wrote in 1851. Worst of all, ‘For six months past I have not had a single opportunity to make use of my acknowledged gift for mixing a lobster salad – quelle horreur; it makes one quite rusty.’
With his nose for the good life, Engels found his release from the banality of the sewing thread business in riding out with the Cheshire Hounds alongside the Marquis of Grosvenor and Earl of Crewe. Indeed, Engels stands as the revolutionary Left’s greatest blood-sports enthusiast, a patron of hare-coursing as well as fox-hunting. ‘On Saturday I went out fox-hunting – seven hours in the saddle,’ he wrote back to Marx, festering away in Bloomsbury. ‘That sort of thing always keeps me in a state of devilish excitement for several days; it’s the greatest physical pleasure I know.’
But such aristocratic excitement was entirely compatible with Engels’s political philosophy. Both he and Marx always regarded the elimination of all social and political inequality as Utopian nonsense. Engels, the Bohemian aficionado of the high life, was never a Leveller. ‘Living conditions will always evince a certain inequality which may be reduced to a minimum but never wholly eliminated,’ he wrote. And perhaps most damningly, ‘The concept of a socialist society as a realm of equality is a one-sided French concept.’
Marx was equally adamant when it came to the issue of equality. According to Terry Eagleton’s new book, ‘He [Marx] was a sworn enemy of uniformity.’ In fact, he regarded equality as a bourgeoisie value. He saw it as a reflection in the political sphere of what he called ‘exchange-value’, in which one commodity is levelled in value with another. He regarded social levelling as ‘a negation of the entire worth of culture and civilisation’ And in the Critique of the Goethe Programme, he also rejected the idea of an equality of income, since people have uniquely different needs.
Instead, both Marx and Engels believed in cascading the pleasures of life – food, sex, drink, culture, travel – down to all classes. Socialism was not a never ending committee meeting, but a life of satiated and unbridled enjoyment. Occasionally, the British Left has managed to echo this ideal – from Nye Bevan’s reputed ‘nothing too good for the working class’ to Tony Crosland’s hope for ‘brighter and cleaner eating houses, more riverside cafes, more pleasure gardens on the Battersea model, more murals and pictures in public places.’ But for the majority of the 20th century, the myriad factions that Marx and Engels inspired usually sucked the joie de vivre out of left-wing politics.
Yet more importantly, at least in terms of electoral consequences, 20th century Labourism neglected serious dialogue about the importance of personal fulfillment, in favour, too often, of talking up the politics of envy. As we emerge, staggering, from a particularly vicious recession, chastened by the palpably unfair sight of the bankers who caused that recession continuing to pocket large bonuses, there is every danger that this tradition will re-emerge. This would be a mistake. Throughout the course of this lecture, I aim to show that the left must choose an equality sensitive to personal freedom. It must choose Engels over Cohen.
Labour in Government: Equality of What?
Greater equality has long been one of the fundamental concerns of those on the left. Writers from within the Labour movement, R.H Tawney, Roy Hattersley and, most influentially of all, Anthony Crossland, all indentified the pursuit of equality – as opposed to public ownership – as the raison d’être of the Labour party.
Yet despite the regular identification of its importance, it is fair to say that little attention has been paid to the ‘Equality of What’ question. As the historian and former Labour cabinet member, Edmund Dell wrote in A Strange Eventful History, his magnum opus on the history of the democratic socialism:
‘The vague objective of greater equality proved to have a longer shelf life than the other objectives of democratic socialism. But equality was never defined and democratic socialists never made a serious attempt to achieve it.’
Dell’s evisceration seemed to have reached a final, resounding conclusion when, in 2009, David Cameron used his conference platform in Manchester to taunt Labour about its record on equality, arguing that the Conservatives were now the party best placed to tackle poverty and inequality. This may, in hindsight, seem faintly incredible but the failings of the coalition should not detract from the legitimacy of the questions that many have posed about Labour’s track record. After all, the financial crisis happened on our watch.
This is not the place for an exhaustive analysis of that record. But key lessons do need to be learned. Labour tolerated too much financial inequality and we were never clear enough about the sort of equality we should be pursuing. Neither did we develop a rationale for prioritising which inequalities we most cared about addressing.
The broad answer to the ‘Equality of What’ question, provided by both Brown and Blair, was that Labour was concerned about ‘equality of opportunity’ as opposed to ‘equality of outcome’; that all should be afforded an equal opportunity to fulfil their potential, in the way that they see fit. But a clear strategy for mitigating the obvious existing inequalities of opportunity, other than through redistribution and public service investment, was never developed. We overlooked the corrosive effect of disempowerment; that public goods and resources are nothing without the power and the freedom to use them. Or to put it differently, it is no good giving somebody a tax credit if they feel disconnected from society and unable to access basic services.
This, coupled with a culture of obfuscation when it came to advertising the Governments redistributive aims, limited the effectiveness of its equality policy agenda. It also undermined the political case in support of it.
It is far too simplistic to suggest that Labour completely failed on equality. As James Purnell has drily noted, ‘For a Government that was thought not to care about inequality, we certainly spent a lot of money on it.’ Labour’s record is frequently judged using unsophisticated resource based metrics such as the Gini coefficient. Such measures do not adequately capture non-cash public goods, such as the quality of education, health or the environment. On this measure, our significant investment in better public services is seen as irrelevant to levels of inequality. Clearly this is flawed; the pervasive, multi-faceted nature of equality’s impact is, after all, surely one of the main insights of The Spirit Level. But, if you adopt an approach that tackles equality purely through basic resource redistribution, then it is perhaps no surprise that resource redistribution becomes the only measurement upon which you are judged.
But how, philosophically, did Labour arrive at this juncture? I will turn now, to explore the austere worlds of Cohen, Sen and, somewhat inevitably, John Rawls. For if Labour’s idea of equality was confused then it was only reflective of the concurrent wider disagreements in academic political philosophy.
Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity
Without doubt John Rawls’s 1971 tome, A Theory of Justice, is the most important work of political philosophy for many decades, if not centuries. And at its heart it is an egalitarian theory.
Cohen, one of Rawls’s staunchest critics, wrote that ‘among what contributes to the greatness of A Theory of Justice, and of the entire Rawlsian achievement, is that, to put the matter as Hegel would have done had he agreed with me, John Rawls grasped his age, or, more precisely, one large reality of his age, in thought. In his work, the politics of liberal [in the American sense] democracy and social [in the European sense] democracy rises to a consciousness of itself.’
And indeed, one can view the Rawlsian project as partially an attempt to synthesise and reconcile the egalitarianism of European Social Democracy with the economic efficacy of free-market, Anglo-Saxon, liberal capitalism.
As such, despite its magnitude and the reverence within which it is held, it is a work riddled with internal tensions and, as a consequence, has been the recipient of much criticism from both the right and left. But to truly understand the debate, we have to go a step further back and apprehend the context into which Rawls crash-landed in 1971.
This was the dispute between classical egalitarians, such as Bernard Williams, and Libertarian theorists like Robert Nozick. Williams maintained the belief that egalitarian theories must distribute resources only according to need. For example, he maintained that it was a necessary truth that ‘the proper ground of the distribution of health care is health need.’
Nozick’s famous reductio ad absurdum retort is that if this is a necessary truth then it seems that, following the same logic, the premise, ‘the proper ground of the distribution of barbering care is barbering need,’ is also a necessary truth. Of course this seems preposterous – in the case of ‘barbering care’ we feel that providers of the services should have a stake in any decision about who gets to use them. Nozick’s argument is that the same ought to be true even of health care providers. Why should they be forced to respond to need, rather than to criteria such as the highest bidder?
And so, pre-Rawls, academic political philosophy seemed perpetually ensnared in this tit-for-tat battle of assertion and counter assertion between egalitarian and libertarian theorists. It was if they were continually caught between the rock of freedom and the hard place of equality, unable to truly reconcile the strong intuitive appeals of each in a single theory. The false dichotomy that this presented had particularly negative political consequences for the left, as the right postured, effectively, as the true protectors of freedom.
Rawls response was not to argue for flat equality of outcome. His ‘first principle of justice’ is a commitment to the same equality of opportunity that exercised New Labour. But to combat opportunity inequalities he proposed a second redistributive principle, the difference principle. The difference principle tolerates inequalities, provided that they benefit the most disadvantaged members of society. The whole point is to permit some incentives for individuals to be more productive, but link that to the benefit of all. Crudely put, this means bigger salaries for socially useful work.
Sen: Equality of Capabilities
Yet we have seen from first-hand experience that the pursuit of equality of opportunity only through a redistribution of resources does not sufficiently advance the cause of creating a society of equals. But in the recent work of the Amartya Sen there is a more promising answer to the equality of what question: equality of capabilities.
Sen was particularly exercised by Rawls’s answer to the question of what Cohen calls, ‘the currency of equality’ – what, do we measure redistributed well-being in? For Rawls, well-being should be indexed in terms of specific ‘primary goods,’ such as rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth. However, Sen was mildly horrified that Rawls’s ideal theory of justice seemed at best ambivalent to the plight of disabled people, who, assuming they were in possession of the primary goods and were not, by that measure, the most disadvantaged member of the whole society, would receive no extra help to lead a fulfilling life.
Sen’s suggestion is that when we come to evaluate whether or not someone is deserving of state support, when we make an assessment on how well that individual’s life is going, we should measure their capability to function and their ability fulfil themselves. In other words, we should not be measuring the resources a person possesses, or the levels of welfare, utility or pleasure they can derive from certain actions or life choices. Instead, we should be measuring what a person, in Sen’s words, ‘can do or be’ – whether they can obtain sufficient nourishment, enjoy a decent life-span and good health, acquire meaningful work, possess self-respect and so on. A capability then, is the freedom to achieve particular functioning’s of a meaningful life, and are, Sen contends, what we should be equalising.
The focus on capabilities can be seen, as indeed Sen does himself, as a natural extension and updating of Rawls’s concern with primary goods. Certainly the two approaches are close philosophical cousins. However there are four subtle, but important differences.
Firstly, in shifting attention from goods to what goods do to human beings, Sen recasts the notion of what it means to be disadvantaged or advantaged in society so that it is less associated with resources and more associated with empowerment. ‘Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods. As Labour found out the hard way – public goods, or resources, are nothing without the power to use them.
Secondly, Sen’s theory is more pluralist than Rawls’s. Sen suggests that Rawl’s theory might be adequate ‘were human beings very like each other.’ However ‘there is evidence that the conversion of goods to capabilities varies from person to person substantially, and the quality of the former may be still be far from the quality of the latter.’ Or in other words, people require different levels of resources to fulfil their basic, more varied capabilities. But in using basic capabilities as the benchmark for equality, Sen also avoids the well known philosophical problem of ‘expensive tastes.’ Resources would not be redistributed to those, like Engels, who ‘have to be deluged in champagne and buried in caviar to bring them to a normal level of utility, which you and I get from sandwich and beer.’ People are free to pursue these expensive tastes, but the state should not subsidise them.
Thirdly, Sen’s conception contains within it a particular theory of responsibility. If one has the capability to achieve functioning, but neglects to do so, then one is responsible for one’s own situation and ceases to possess a legitimate claim against others for help. This clearly contrasts with Bernard Williams’ paradigmatic claim that egalitarian distribution is applied according to need and can broadly be seen as a response to Libertarian objections, ranging from Nozick’s ‘distribution of barbering care’ to the Daily Mail’s attacks on benefit scroungers.
Finally, his approach focuses on positive freedom. Positive freedom is a person’s ability to be or do something. This contrasts with negative freedom, the approach favoured by the right, which focus exclusively on not-interference in other peoples lives. Sen’s commitment to positive freedom is deeply personal, having witnessed thousands die in the Bengal famine of 1943. The negative freedom of the famine victims’ freedom to buy food was not affected. However, because they lacked the positive freedom to actively do anything they still starved. They lacked the power or the capability to exercise their freedom.
The Future of Equality
But how does all of this tie in with The Spirit Level and the lifestyle of Fredrich Engels?
The first thing to say is that many people have mistakenly read The Spirit Level as being a political or a moral argument for the inherent value of equality. It is of course, neither. Rather, the conclusion of The Spirit Level is that equality is of profound instrumental value. It is valuable because it grants us better access to a staggering range of other desirable outcomes. More equal societies do not ‘do better’ simply because they are more equal. They ‘do better’ because they have higher rates of child wellbeing, or educational attainment, or social mobility, or levels of social trust and cohesion.
Such multi-faceted problems require complex policy solutions; to reduce the focus of equality to abstract resource based measures such as the Gini coefficient is to miss the point and the real target of political concern entirely. Money remains important; its ability to enable people to expand their choices, horizons and opportunities should not be understated. However, beginning with Marx’s critique of commodification, the left has always argued, rightly, that everything of value cannot be reduced to money or measured by price. Sen’s capabilities theory of equality is helpful in encouraging us to consider a broader, more pluralistic, range of factors that enable people’s lives to go well.
And Engels? Once more, an insight from the Spirit Level is instructive. This time however, I turn to a particularly astute comment contained within the foreword:
“Yet unless it is possible to change the way most people see the societies they live in, this theory will be stillborn. Public opinion will only support the necessary political changes if something like the perspective we outline in this book permeates the public mind.”
This political challenge is not to be underestimated. To create a more equal Britain, a Britain that empowers people and works to create a society based on reciprocal, co-operative relationships, it is vital that we speak the language of personal freedom and individual aspiration. Whilst we acknowledge that an understanding of our shared fate and a more equal society benefits all, we must allow all individuals the real, positive freedom to pursue their idea of the good life. Otherwise, we will fall into precisely the false dichotomy that characterised pre-Rawlsian political philosophy and allow the right to monopolise the value of freedom, claiming it as their own.
Conclusion
It is often said that the relationship between contemporary political philosophy and the more prosaic realities of ‘real’ politics, is an oblique one.
Yet it is almost possible to trace the recent history of British politics through concurrent developments in political philosophy. Most explicitly of course was Margaret Thatcher’s, ‘Hayek in the handbag’ government, with the economics of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and the libertarian philosophy of Robert Nozick driving the deregulated, neoliberal agenda.
For Rawls’s reaction, and his attempt to infuse free-market liberal capitalism with European Social Democracy, read New Labour and the ‘third-way’; espousing, contra the libertarian ravages of the Thatcherite Neoliberals, an equality of opportunity, yet ultimately unable to mitigate against inequality with anything more sophisticated than resource redistribution.
This brings us to the current crossroads. It is clear that the coalition government, ideologically, offers merely a rehash of the libertarian Neoliberal ideology. If not Thatcherite, then at least Thatcher-lite.
On the left, we face our perennial challenge: how to offer a new political programme that offers greater social justice without restricting richer personal fulfilment to the point that it begins to impinge upon freedom. The Spirit Level shows that at the heart of this programme must be a commitment to greater income equality. However, more importantly this commitment must be a component part of a far more sophisticated approach to equality in general.
In Amartya Sen’s capability theory, we have an approach that can focus us on the range of factors that empower people to lead a fulfilled and meaningful life, whilst at the same time articulating a positive conception of freedom that contrasts strongly with the limited sense that the right understand freedom. An approach to equality that is simultaneously more empowering, responsible, pluralistic and that chimes with a chimes with our belief in empowering people with enough positive freedom to pursue their own sense of fulfilment. It is a theory that makes a strong and authentic affirmation to equality but one that would not preclude Engels’ enjoyment of claret, hunting with the Cheshire hounds or even purchasing a fine Black Jasper Vase, from here at Wedgwood.